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1 The potential use of nuclear weapons to deter or defeat the use of WMD during a conflict is
not the same thing as the preemptive use of military force , i.e. the initiation of a conflict, against
a nation armed with WMD. While the United States does not rule out the possible use of nuclear
weapons at any point in a conflict, the recent war in Iraq demonstrates that the preemptive use
of force can, and almost certainly will, consist of attacks with conventional weapons.
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Summary
In the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, the Bush Administration outlined a new role
for U.S. nuclear weapons that goes beyond the concept of deterrence from the Cold War.
It also identified a new targeting strategy that would seek to threaten specific capabilities
in adversary nations. Furthermore, the Administration has pledged to restore and
enhance the U.S. nuclear weapons infrastructure, as part of the U.S. effort to deter the
emergence of new threats in the future. In implementing the NPR, the Administration
has requested funding for studies on new types of nuclear weapons. The Administration
claims these projects, if they eventually produce new weapons, would enhance
deterrence; critics claim they will make nuclear use more likely and undermine U.S.
nonproliferation goals. This report will be updated as needed.
The Bush Administration’s Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), completed at the end of
2001, sought to adjust the U.S. nuclear posture to reflect, on the one hand, the emergence
of a more cooperative relationship between the United States and Russia, and, on the
other hand, increasing threats from other states and non-state actors, particularly those
armed with nuclear, chemical and biological weapons (weapons of mass destruction or
WMD). The Administration has highlighted these changes in the international security
environment in several documents, including the U.S. National Security Strategy and the
Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction. The Administration has also
emphasized that the United States will use any means necessary to deter or defeat the use
of WMD by rogue nations or terrorist groups. One of the issues highlighted in the
Nuclear Posture Review is the role that nuclear weapons might play in addressing these
emerging threats.1
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When Congress reviewed the NPR in early 2002, much of the debate focused on
proposed reductions in strategic offensive nuclear weapons and the eventual disposition
of warheads removed from deployment. This debate coincided with the negotiation of the
Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (Treaty of Moscow), which codified the NPR’s
recommendation that the United States reduce its operationally deployed strategic forces
to between 1,700 and 2,200 warheads by 2012. But the NPR’s recommendations went
beyond reductions in deployed nuclear warheads. It outlined a new doctrine on the role
of nuclear weapons in U.S. military and security strategy; it identified a new targeting
strategy that would guide decisions about the size and structure of U.S. nuclear forces, and
it revised plans to rebuild and restore the U.S. nuclear weapons infrastructure so that the
United States could maintain and enhance its nuclear forces for the foreseeable future.
To implement these changes, the Bush Administration has requested funding for research
into new nuclear weapons concepts, relief from legislation passed in 1993 that prohibited
research on low-yield nuclear weapons, and funding to enhance U.S. readiness to conduct
explosive nuclear tests.
This report summarizes how changes in U.S. nuclear weapons doctrine and strategy,
along with the renewed emphasis on the nuclear weapons infrastructure, contribute to the
Administration’s plans for new nuclear weapons programs. It also reviews several issues
raised during the debate on these programs that may serve as the foundation for a broader
debate on the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security. The report does not
provide a comprehensive review of the Nuclear Posture Review or a detailed description
of the new weapons research programs.2 Instead, it seeks to provide a context for debate
about these new weapons programs.
Nuclear Doctrine
Throughout the Cold War, the United States maintained nuclear weapons to deter
nuclear and conventional attacks by the Soviet Union and its allies against the United
States and its allies. At its extreme, such a conflict could have led to a global nuclear war.
But the United States also did not rule out the possible use of nuclear weapons in smaller
conflicts or to achieve goals other than deterrence. However, because U.S. forces were
sized to meet the Soviet threat, other nations and other threats to U.S. security were
viewed as “lesser included cases.”
The Bush Administration has emphasized that, even with the demise of the Soviet
Union, nuclear weapons “continue to be essential to our security, and that of our friends
and allies.”3 Furthermore, it has identified a role for nuclear weapons that it asserts is
both more comprehensive than the Cold War concept of deterrence and more integrated
with the rest of the U.S. military establishment. The Administration has argued that
nuclear weapons, along with missile defenses and U.S. conventional forces, not onlydeter
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adversaries from attacking the United States during a conflict or crisis by promising an
unacceptable amount of damage in response to an adversary’s attack, they can also assure
allies and friends of the U.S. commitment to their security, dissuade potential adversaries
from challenging the United States during a crisis with nuclear weapons or other
“asymmetrical threats,” and defeat enemies by holding at risk those targets that could not
be destroyed with other types of weapons.4 Many analysts see little difference between
these goals and those the United States pursued during the Cold War. Nevertheless,
according to the Bush Administration, to support this broader array of objectives, the
United States may need nuclear weapons that are different, in both numbers and
capabilities, from the weapons remaining in the U.S. arsenal after the Cold War.
Targeting and Employment Planning
During the Cold War, the United States maintained the numbers and types of nuclear
weapons that it believed it needed to threaten the full range of potential targets in the
Soviet Union. The Bush Administration has referred to this as “threat-based” targeting
because it is linked to the “Soviet threat.” The Administration has stated that the United
States will no longer use this model to calculate its nuclear requirements. Instead, the
United States would “look more at a broad range of capabilities and contingencies that
the United States may confront” and tailor U.S. military capabilities to address this wide
spectrum of possible contingencies.5 Specifically, the United States would identify
potential conflicts, review the capabilities of its possible adversaries, identify those
nuclear capabilities that the United States might need to attack or threaten the adversary,
and develop a force posture and nuclear weapons employment strategy that would allow
it to attack those capabilities. For most possible contingencies, such as those against
North Korea or other rogue nations, the numbers of required nuclear weapons is likely to
be very small. But, according to the Administration, Russia presents a “potential
contingency” that could emerge if the relationship between the two nations were to
change. Most analysts believe that this “potential” is the source of the Administration’s
interest in retaining several thousand nuclear weapons in the U.S. arsenal.
The Bush Administration has not described the specific capabilities it will target with
this new strategy. During the Cold War, the United States sought to target military,
industrial, and leadership facilities in the former Soviet Union. Similar facilities are likely
to be included on the list of “capabilities” that the United States would want to threaten
in some contingencies with other nations because, by destroying these capabilities, the
United States could expect to achieve its war objectives. The Bush Administration has
specifically highlighted hardened and deeplyburied targets and facilities housing nuclear,
chemical, or biological weapons as potential capabilities that it might want to threaten.
These types of targets are not new to U.S. war plans because the Soviet Union had many
hardened and deeply buried targets, such as missile silos and command posts, and it had
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storage depots that housed chemical weapons. The United States presumably planned to
attack and destroy these facilities in a conflict with the Soviet Union.
According to the Administration, however, the United States cannot be certain where
these threats will appear in the future. Therefore, it must plan for known, potential, and
unexpected contingencies.6 Further, to deter potential and unexpected contingencies, the
United States would need the capability to credibly threaten targets in nations that it may
not be able to identify ahead of time. It also must have the intelligence to identify these
targets and the rapid targeting and response capabilities to address these contingencies as
they come up. Hence, the difficulties with this approach stem from more than just a
requirement to attack hardened and deeply buried targets.
Nuclear Weapons Infrastructure
The Bush Administration is attempting to integrate the nuclear weapons
infrastructure into its new concept of deterrence. According to the Administration, an
infrastructure that allows the United States to sustain its forces and adapt them to meet
emerging needs would “provide the United States with the means to respond to new,
unexpected, or emerging threats in a timely manner.” Furthermore, the “ability to
innovate and produce small builds of special purpose weapons would convince an
adversary that it could not expect to negate U.S. nuclear weapons capabilities.”7 The
Administration has also linked the modernization of the nuclear weapons complex to its
plans to reduce the size of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. The planned reductions will occur in
parallel with improvements in the weapons complex to ensure that the reductions did not
get ahead of the U.S. ability to maintain and modernize its remaining weapons.
The Administration has identified several specific tasks that the infrastructure must
accomplish over the next decade. Many are associated with the efforts to maintain and
refurbish existing nuclear weapons. But the Administration has also outlined plans to
establish small “advanced warhead concepts teams” to evaluate evolving military
requirements and assess options for new or modified warheads.8 The Administration
notes that this effort will not only prepare the United States to respond to emerging
threats, but will also help train the next generation of weapons scientists. The
Administration has also requested funding for a study on the conversion of an existing
nuclear weapon into a “robust nuclear earth-penetrator” and for a study that will explore
options for the design of a new low-yield nuclear weapon. The Administration argues that
this research will not inevitably lead to the design, development, and production of new
weapons. Nevertheless, manyanalysts fear that the United States will eventually produce
new weapons to support an enhanced warfighting role for nuclear weapons.
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Issues for Congress
Battlefield Nuclear Weapons. During the Cold War, the U.S. nuclear arsenal
contained many types of delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons, including short-range
missiles and artillery for use on the battlefield, medium-range land-based and sea-based
missiles and aircraft, long-range missiles based on U.S. territory and submarines, and
heavy bombers that could threaten Soviet targets from their bases in the United States.
In the early 1990s, the United States withdrew from deployment and eliminated almost
all of its shorter- and medium-range nuclear weapons, leaving a force consisting of mostly
longer-range strategic weapons. The United States concluded that the shorter range
systems had little utility after the demise of the Soviet Union and the virtual elimination
of the threat of a ground war in Europe or Asia. Under these circumstances, the United
States no longer needed to threaten targets, such as troop concentrations or support and
logistics facilities, on the battlefield.
If it deploys the new types of nuclear weapons under consideration by the Bush
Administration, the United States could return to a nuclear posture that includes
battlefield nuclear weapons. Unlike during the Cold War, when battlefield weapons were
deployed near their targets, the United States might use long-range or intercontinental
missiles or aircraft to deliver these weapons. But they would, like the shorter-range
weapons of the Cold War era, seek to achieve precise objectives on the battlefield,
assuming, of course, that the United States had the intelligence and targeting capabilities
to identify these targets. Many analysts consider these weapons more useful for war-
fighting than deterrence, and many have questioned whether the Bush Administration, in
pursuing these weapons, might be moving the United States towards a posture where it
would be more likely to use nuclear weapons in a conflict.
Credible Deterrence vs. Likelihood of Use. The debate over whether the new
nuclear weapons concepts are better suited to warfighting or deterrence follows from a
more fundamental debate over how to make deterrence credible. This debate surfaced
frequently during the Cold War, when the United States sought to deter not only a Soviet
nuclear attack on the United States but also a conventional attack by the Soviet Union or
its allies against U.S. allies. Many analysts consider this issue to be even more relevant
now, when the United States might seek to use its nuclear deterrent in contingencies with
more specific and limited goals against an adversary who possesses few or no nuclear
weapons. The Bush Administration plans to develop a more focused nuclear war-fighting
capability for the United States, one that includes an improved ability to destroy hardened
and deeply buried targets and other capabilities in a number of nations that might threaten
the United States. It has stated that these plans and capabilities would make nuclear use
less likely because it would make the U.S. deterrent more credible and robust.9
Critics of the Administration’s policy question this contention. Many analysts doubt
that leaders of smaller, non-nuclear countries will view any U.S. threat to use nuclear
weapons as credible, regardless of the yield or capability of U.S. nuclear weapons. If they
do not believe the United States will strike with nuclear weapons, then they would not be
deterred by the threat. Others argue that the United States can credibly threaten any
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nation, and therefore deter or defeat that nation, with its conventional forces. They
believe this eliminates any requirement for new and improved nuclear weapons. And
some analysts question whether nuclear threats against specific, and possibly remote
facilities, will deter leaders in smaller, rogue nations. These leaders may believe they can
absorb a small nuclear strike from the United States and still achieve their war aims.
Critics of the Administration’s policy, therefore, fear that by developing nuclear
weapons for battlefield uses, the United States may be more likely to use these systems
in a conflict. They worry that this would be particularly true if the adversary could not
strike back against the United States with nuclear weapons, as the Soviet Union could.
These analysts fear that, as time passes, as the memories of the horrors of nuclear use fade
and as concerns about the horrors of chemical and biological weapons increase, U.S.
officials may begin to believe that the unilateral use of nuclear weapons by the United
States represents the less horrible outcome for the United States than the alternative where
an adversary uses chemical or biological weapons against U.S. interests.
U.S. Nuclear Posture and Nonproliferation Policy
The Bush Administration has stated that nuclear weapons will play a role in U.S.
security policy for the foreseeable future. But, under the1968 Nuclear Non-proliferation
Treaty, the United States has pledged to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in U.S.
security policy. The Administration claims that these two goals do not conflict; nuclear
weapons will play a smaller, albeit important role in U.S. policy than they did during the
Cold War era. Critics, however, argue that the U.S. approach may undermine U.S. efforts
to discourage nuclear proliferation. Some believe that it would be difficult for the United
States to urge restraint on nations that may be close to acquiring nuclear weapons if it
demonstrates, with its own nuclear posture, that nuclear weapons are critical to national
security. Some analysts have also noted that, if potential adversaries were to acquire
nuclear weapons, the threat they pose to U.S. security could grow dramatically.
Consequently, these critics argue, the United States should seek to “marginalize as much
as possible the role that nuclear weapons play in U.S. defense and foreign policy.”10
Others, however, argue that U.S. nuclear policy is not likely to affect U.S.
nonproliferation policy because countries seeking nuclear weapons do so because they
have concerns about their relationships with regional adversaries, not because the United
States has nuclear weapons. In addition, the Bush Administration has argued that the U.S.
development of nuclear weapons that can defeat hardened and deeplyburied targets or can
destroy stocks of chemical and biological weapons are a part of the U.S. effort to
discourage other nations from acquiring and threatening to use WMD.
Regardless of the implications, the United States has clearly begun to pursue
research, and possibly the development, of new nuclear weapons. Although it is unlikely
to resolve the theoretical controversies, Congress may review and debate the merits and
particulars of these programs – and their broader implications – in the coming months.
